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ABSTRACT Are road pricing strategies regressive or progressive? This is a question that
has been confronting researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers who seek to implement
new mechanisms to raise funds for transportation while simultaneously managing demand.
The theoretical literature is mixed, as is the empirical literature. In part, this has to do with
the various types of road pricing strategies that are being debated, different definitions of
equity, and alternative assumptions about revenue recycling. Despite this seeming
complexity, the literature is clear that equity issues are addressable. This paper provides a
synthesis of the literature to date on both the theory of equity, as applied to road pricing,
and the findings of empirical and simulation studies of the effects of particular implemen-
tations of road pricing, and suggested remedies for real or perceived inequities. To summa-
rize, while there are certainly potential issues with equity associated with road pricing, those
issues can be addressed with intelligent mechanism design that provides the right incentives
to travellers and uses the raised revenues in a way to achieve desired equitable ends. These
include cutting other taxes and investing in infrastructure and services.
Introduction
Social welfare comprises both efficiency, a measure of the degree to which system
outputs achieve a theoretical maximum (minimum) using the same level of
inputs, and equity, a measure of the distribution of outputs (or inputs) across
some population. Political acceptability depends very much on the distribution
(and perception of the distribution) of gains and losses to a proposed change. This
paper examines equity issues surrounding road pricing, which raises revenue and
offers the ability to manage demand on the road network by location and time of
day, charging more when and where congestion is in place.
Alternatives to pay for roads are motivated by numerous factors: 
● First, there is a trend toward higher mileage cars and ultimately away from
gasoline as the fuel of choice for both environmental and economic reasons,
affecting gas tax revenue, which in many places is dedicated to roads.
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● Second, there is a desire to better tie road charges to road use, in particular to
be specific by time of day and location to address congestion issues.
● Third, there is a need to raise additional revenues for transportation, both to
maintain and replace aging infrastructure, and to expand transportation
networks to serve growing demand.
● Fourth, there is an environmental interest in directly internalizing the non-
congestion externalities of road use, and the fuel tax can only do so indirectly,1
● Fifth, private ownership, which is increasingly seen in the roads sector, tends
to require a dedicated stream of revenue associated with the specific facility.
● Sixth, there is political advantage to shift the burden of payment and tax
exporting.2
Ramjerdi writes: “Sen (1992) states that every normative social theory that has
stood the test of time demands equality along some dimension that is regarded as
particularly important in that theory. Sen also suggests that demanding equality
in one space implies inequality in some other space.” (2006, p. 67) Within road
pricing there are three decisions that affect equity: allocating the burden of
charges, spending the revenue, and distributing the externalities (Langmyhr,
1997). Road pricing also affects the amount and type of mobility that is subse-
quently consumed. Rietveld (2003) argues equity plays two roles in transport:
inequity may be a side effect of attempts to address efficiency and environmental
issues, and equity may be the target of policies such as building infrastructure in
undeveloped areas.
Flynn (2006) reviews the literature and identifies steps necessary to implement
pricing in New York, he cites (Jones, 2001) that inequity can be mitigated through
five parameters: 
● the basis of charging (e.g. point charges, cordon or area charges, trip length
charges),
● the area covered by the charge,
● the time period covered,
● discounts or exemptions, and
● linkages to other transport charges such as reduced public transit fares.
The first three items are questions of the design of the system. Roughly pricing
proposals break down into facility-based (a road or a High Occupancy Toll (HOT)
lane), area-based (a cordon or area-wide charge), or network-wide (distance-
based charges or charges on many or every link). The latter two items in the list
are questions of what to do with the revenue that is collected.
On the topic of road pricing at the intersection of engineering and economics,
equity arises as a central feature in effectiveness, acceptability and implementabil-
ity. Foster (1974, 1975) was perhaps the first to argue that road pricing discriminates
against the poor. Depending on circumstances, this may be true if revenues are not
recycled (i.e. used in a way that benefits the lower income group). The marginal
utility of money may be higher among the poor (Brekke et al., 1996; Brekke, 1997;
Medin et al., 2001), leading to difficulties in analysing the welfare effects of pricing
if money is assumed equally valuable.
Any change will create winners and losers, and though there is always a search
for Pareto Efficient solutions (at Pareto Optimality no one can gain without some-






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 35
desired that the losers actually be compensated (Pareto Efficiency only requires
that compensation could theoretically be made, not that it actually take place).
The Dalton Principle says that transfer of income to a lower income individual
from a higher income individual, so long as it keeps the rankings of individuals
unchanged, improves equity (Ramjerdi, 2006; Rietveld, 2003).
The equity issues associated with road pricing (on both public and private
roads) have not escaped academic attention, a brief review (almost certainly
incomplete) has turned up more than 100 papers on the topic. The findings of the
important contributions are summarized below.
This paper next develops a typology of road pricing. This is followed by
various definitions of equity. Next presented are empirical findings from studies
of in-place (or soon to be in-place) pricing trials. Simulated findings from
proposed scenarios are described. Acceptability is considered and winners and
losers identified. A discussion of what to do with the revenue follows. The paper
closes with discussion and conclusions.
Types of Road Pricing
Figure 1, in the form of a 3-dimensional matrix, organizes the major dimensions
of road pricing: the spatial resolution (which set of links are priced: all links, links
on a particular facility, or links in or defining a particular region), the pricing
objective, and the temporal resolution of how quickly prices shift. This matrix
implies 6 × 5 × 3 = 90 different types of road pricing. And while incomplete, this
considers much of the literature and likely policy directions. This does not
directly address a number of other parameters (e.g. ownership, regulatory
regime, duration of pricing period, relationship to other road charges, differentia-
tion between cars and trucks).
Figure 1. Types of road pricing strategies. Each row indicates a different spatial type, each column a different pricing objective, and each page a different temporal resolution on the pricing strategy. The current US situation, where gas taxes applied uniformly over states is best
described as the upper left cell of the front page of the matrix: general pricing
with uniform links, with average cost prices, that are coarse (unvarying over time,
at least within the congested period). The theoretical ideal from an economic effi-
ciency point-of-view is in the bottom right of the last page of the matrix, general
pricing with differentiated links (not all links have the same price), using first-
best marginal cost prices3 which vary dynamically over time.4 The practical diffi-
culties prevent moving from the upper left to the lower right, (not the least of
which are implementation (transaction and collection) costs) leaving many
interim, sometimes called second-best solutions as the range of potential policy
solutions. Verhoef et al. (2003) describe potential implementation paths for social
marginal cost-based pricing strategies, emphasizing the need to consider second-
best pricing approaches rather than switching to road pricing in a ‘big bang’ all-
at-once transition.
There are many types of road pricing, each located at different points on the
efficiency and multi-dimensional equity frontier.
Defining Equity: Dimensions and Measures
Dimensions of Equity
The term equity has both a descriptive (positive) and normative use. It is gener-





















































































































































































































































































































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 37
than an absolute: a situation is or is not equitable. A number of the terms used are
discussed below: 
● Opportunity, or process, equity—the extent to which there is fair access to the
planning and decision-making process (Fairness).
● Outcome, or result, equity—the extent to which consequences of a decision are
considered just (Justice).
Within outcome equity, there are a number of dimensions across which equity
can be quantified: 
● Horizontal equity—the extent to which individuals within a class (e.g. in come,
gender, ability, race) are treated similarly
● Vertical equity—the extent to which members of different classes are treated
similarly
● Spatial, or territorial, equity—the extent to which benefits and costs are distrib-
uted equally over space (Viegas, 2001)
● Longitudinal, generational, or temporal, equity—the extent to which benefits
and losses are distributed to the present or the future (Viegas, 2001)
● Market Equity, or the benefit principle, — the extent to which the benefit
received is proportional to the price paid
● Social equity—the extent to which allocation is proportionate to need (Jones,
2003).
The free rider problem associated with the spatial nature of infrastructure
exemplifies certain types of equity issues. Roads are provided locally, but used by
both local and non-local users. For large jurisdictions, this is a minor issue as most
travel is local, but for small jurisdictions, the likelihood of non-local travellers
increases. This explains why tolls are more common on the east coast of the USA
where jurisdictions are small and interstate travel is a relatively large share of all
travel compared with the big states in the western USA.
The benefit principle, where those who benefit should pay in proportion to their
benefit rather than in proportion to the cost imposed (which may be related), can
also be illustrated. If non-residents free-ride they violate the benefit principle. In
contrast, with tolls, if non-residents pay more than their use, cross-subsidizing local
travellers, the benefit principle is violated in the opposite direction. King et al. (2007)
extends Levinson (2001) to identify subunits of government as potential recipients
of recycled revenue (as opposed to being the unit which tolls roads) to create a class
of beneficiaries from road pricing and thereby shift the political calculus.
Debt financing (or its absence) illustrates a third free rider problem, that of
generational equity. With financing, people today can use a road that will be paid
for in the future by others, without financing, future users enjoy a road paid for
by predecessors. Some of these benefits may be capitalized in land, others not.
Clearly infrastructure is not distributed evenly, and some areas have a surplus
and others a deficit, suggesting social equity is not always satisfied.
Identifying Transport Inequities
Most transport equity concerns are determined by those who are a party to the























































These changes are considered externalities. Levinson (2002) identifies two types
of externalities in transportation: 
● Technical externalities—the classic external costs of air pollution, noise pollu-
tion and carbon emissions, borne by those who do not directly benefit from the
travel (neither the traveller nor the road agency).
● Mobility externalities—transportation projects benefit some parties but worsen
conditions for other travellers. Inter-modal mobility externalities are illustrated
by a quote from Ivan Illich “Motorized vehicles create remoteness which they
alone can shrink. They create distances for all and shrink them for only a few”
(1974, p. 42). Mobility externalities can occur within a mode as well as when a
freeway interrupts a local grid of streets, or traffic calming reduces traffic on
some streets to the detriment of others. Inequity is endemic in transportation,
Levinson (2005) examines the ‘micro-foundations of congestion and pricing’ and
illustrates using game theory for a very simple case that road pricing on a facility
where travellers can adjust travel times (with associated schedule delay penal-
ties) may have Nash equilibria that are inequitable. Some travel costs borne are
directly by the user while different costs are borne by other users (Nash, 2001).
Crashes and congestion are both externalities from the individual point of
view, my actions create problems for others, but those others are travellers, so
these costs are internal to the transportation system.
In discussions of transportation equity, the topic of environmental justice is often
raised. Environmental justice was established in the USA by Presidential Execu-
tive Order, and, when applied to the development of environmental laws and
policies considers “fair treatment for people of all races, cultures, and incomes”
(Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, 1994). Forkenbrock and Schweitzer define environmental justice as: 
Concerned with a variety of public policy efforts to ensure that the
adverse human health or environmental effects of governmental activi-
ties do not fall disproportionately upon minority populations and low-
income populations. In the realm of transportation, environmental justice
requires that transportation system changes, such as road improvements,
be studied carefully to identify the nature, extent, and incidence of proba-
ble consequences, both favorable and adverse. (1999, p. 96)
Environmental Justice thus only examines environmental outcomes and only
addresses a few strata of affected classes.
The term social exclusion (or more positively social inclusion) also comes to the
fore. “An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident
in a society but (b) he or she does not participate in the normal activities of
citizens in that society” (Burchardt et al., 1999, p. 229). Social exclusion may be
due to, e.g. physical disability, prejudice, lack of knowledge of the common
language or lack of resources.
Measures of Inequity
Ramjerdi (2006) summarizes a number of potential measures of inequality (mean,






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 39
variance, variance of logarithms, Theil’s entropy, Gini coefficient, Atkinson
measure and Kolm measure), and finds none which are both scale invariant and
translationally invariant. In summary, among researchers there is no consensus
definition of which equity dimension(s) to consider, and no consensus of which
measure to use, and each study defines equity differently. The remainder of this
paper will report on the measures that were used in various studies, recognizing
no one study is complete by considering all of the dimensions and all measures
for each dimension.
Review of Empirical Findings
Area-wide and Cordon Pricing
Singapore had the first road pricing deployment with its Area Licensing Scheme.
It was later upgraded to Electronic Road Pricing. Olszewski and Xie (2005) argues
the Singapore experience is evidence that road pricing is effective in controlling
congestion. Wilson (1988) found that while the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme
reduced peak hour traffic by 65%, and bus ridership increased from 35.9 to 43.9%;
more travellers (44.1%) saw longer travel time and fewer (36.1%) saw a reduction
as slower (and now more crowded) buses substituted for faster cars. While
congestion management as in Singapore may lower welfare for some users,
investing in grade-separated alternative modes (in Singapore Mass Rapid Transit
(MRT) and Light Rail Transit (LRT)) can mitigate the effects of the road charge
(Goh, 2002).
Norway had an early implementation of congestion pricing using toll rings,
where prices varied by time of day to manage congestion. Langmyhr (1997) uses
the Norwegian case to understand equity considerations, developing a thorough
framework of different equity concerns. Ramjerdi (2006) argues, after testing
scenarios with various types of revenue recycling for a proposed charge in Oslo,
Norway, no single equity measure is appropriate to use, and different measures
lead to different policy conclusions; therefore multiple measures should be
considered.
The case of London has probably received the most attention. Transport for
London, the agency tasked with implementing the London Congestion Charging
(LCC) scheme, has conducted regular analysis of equity and distributional effects
both before and after opening.5 Banister (2002), writing just before the LCC open-
ing, notes there is almost no empirical literature on the effect of road pricing on
land use, and whether it will lead to centralization or decentralization of activities.
He argues that while “the impact of road pricing on all travellers is progressive”,
and bus users will benefit from both the faster speeds and the use of road pricing
revenues, “the impact on low-income car owners is regressive” (Banister, 1994).
The issue of boundary effects also arises, especially important with cordon pricing
schemes as the cost of driving to areas just inside a boundary will be significantly
higher than staying just outside. (One might note that spillover parking issues also
arise naturally in such a case, especially if parking is uncharged or undercharged.
Similarly, under cordon pricing, one would expect parking charges would drop as
road pricing increased, since demand for parking is lowered and parking is fixed,
thereby mitigating the effectiveness of the cordon charge on locally destined traf-
fic). The nature of the land use effects depends on the nature of the road pricing,























































expects a denser urban form as people try to reduce travel costs. However if the
price of travel only increases locally, there may be substitution effects as people
avoid the area with higher travel costs ceteris paribus.
Ison (1998) discusses the issues of implementing road pricing, and presents
evidence that without revenue recycling, pricing is generally considered unac-
ceptable, and the preferred way in the UK to allocate revenues raised from pricing
was to public transport locally, and to local roads secondarily.
Ison and Rye (2005) notes how equity in the LCC scheme can be achieved by
providing exemptions from the charge for certain groups, e.g. “alternative fuel
vehicles; vehicles driven by or carrying disabled people who have registered for a
100% discount; emergency vehicles; vehicles with nine or more seats; motorbikes
and mopeds; black cabs and London-licensed mini-cabs; and residents within the
charging zone (who get a 90% discount).” “[T]he key in terms of acceptance is to
keep the inequity to a minimum.”
Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) examine the then proposed Stockholm road
pricing case for equity consequences. The two key issues they argue for equity are
who is affected by the charge and how is the revenue used, which are much more
important than any other issues such as value of time. In the case of Stockholm, it
is argued men, the wealthy and those living in the centre city are affected most by
the charge, while the revenue spending on public transport benefits women and
those with lower incomes, and thus the scheme is progressive.
All of the area and cordon-based road pricing schemes affect those inside and
outside the boundary differently, and this boundary effect is well-recognized by
travellers (and is likely one of the reasons the proposed congestion charge in
Manhattan failed to garner legislative approval). Using the revenue in a way to
benefit the losers is critical, and some of the alternative are discussed in the
section ‘Recycling the Revenue’.
HOT Lanes
Many implemented facility pricing strategies in the USA fall on HOT lanes,
which have been extensively evaluated for their equity implications. Looking at
the equity concerns associated with proposed HOT lane projects, which have
been derided as ‘Lexus Lanes’,6Weinstein and Sciara (2006) notes that equity may
arise as an issue at any stage of project development, and is not something can
simply be addressed beforehand, but instead continuous monitoring of the
equity implications projects is required both before and after opening. Planners
would be wise to engage the issue proactively. HOT lanes are generally coupled
with parallel free lanes, where the free lanes may be left for equity reasons
(Verhoef et al., 1996).
Parkany (2005) identifies the equity issues associated with transponder owner-
ship. Acquiring a transponder is a barrier to entry for many who wish to use
roads metered by electronic tolls, and it turns out that many low-income house-
holds do not have either credit cards or bank accounts that are often necessary
pre-requisites to transponder ownership. Examination of SR-91 and Pennsylvania
Turnpike data shows wealthier individuals are both more likely to own transpon-
ders, and use electronic toll lanes more often given they own transponders. For
routes like HOT lanes where transponder ownership is mandatory to access the
system, this may pose an additional equity issue, while when there are alterna-






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 41
A study of SR91 by Sullivan (2000) found lower-income drivers approved of the
lanes almost as much as wealthier drivers, though wealthier drivers did make
more use of the facility.
Examining the I-15 HOT lanes in San Diego, Supernak et al. states “Equity
issues … did not emerge despite the fact that FasTrak users came from the highest
income groups.” (2002, p. 85) Users perceived the system as fair, as it was seen
that travel time benefits went to those who paid.
Smirti et al. (2007) summarizes literature and interviews a number of players for
various congestion charging proposals in California. There was consensus that to
achieve political acceptability, excess revenues should remain within the project
corridor, and especially be allocated for transit.
The QuickRide system is a HOT lane along the Katy Freeway in Houston.
Burris and Appiah (2004); Burris and Hannay (2003) found that while usage
among enrollees did not vary by income, the decision to enroll was correlated
with income, with high-income travellers more likely to enroll in the system than
those with lower incomes. Further the system is more widely used by long-
distance than short-distance travellers, and by commuters more than travellers
engaged in non-work trip purposes.
In Minnesota on the I-394 MnPASS lanes, while support was largely indepen-
dent of income, it is clear that higher income individuals use the system more
frequently, in part because of its location serving high-income communities, but
even after controlling for location there is an income effect (Patterson, 2007). In
the corridor though, income was not related to willingness to pay to save time
Tilahun and Levinson (2009). Few individuals in the corridor cited social equity
as a concern with the conversion of the carpool lanes to HOT lanes (Douma et al.,
2005).
Overall, while the HOT lanes tend to benefit the better-off more than the poor,
acceptability after implementation is widespread across groups, and all groups
make some use of the guaranteed reliable travel times that HOT lanes offer
(everyone is in a hurry sometimes).
Review of Simulated Findings
There have been far more road pricing proposals than actual implementations.
Thus many of the results about road pricing are based on computer simulations of
the expected effects of road pricing rather than measurements of actual effects.
While actual measurements are to be preferred where available, the relative
dearth of road pricing implementations leads us to depend on simulations for
some of our evidence. This section summarizes the results from simulations of
particular proposed cases.
Urban Road Pricing
Mitchell (2005) considered the environmental justice effects of road pricing in
Leeds, looking at the effects of changes on pollution by income category using a
modelling approach. For the base case there is an association between economic
deprivation and pollution levels. For the case with road pricing, the pollution
reduction associated with pricing benefits the most deprived quartile more than
the highest income quartile. The exact changes depend on the specifics of the























































effectively than Low Emission Zones (LEZs). Bonsall and Kelly (2005) studies the
same scheme, concluding road user charging will increase social exclusion for
some drivers, especially for low-income, car-captive travellers.
Whether road pricing is regressive or progressive depends on circumstances,
and tests via traffic simulation for proposed cordon toll scheme in three UK towns
(Cambridge, Northampton and Bedford), even before redistribution, because of
the mix of incomes and mix of transit passengers, pedestrians, bicyclists and
drivers (Santos and Rojey, 2004).
Raje et al. (2004) describes potential exemptions for the proposed Edinburgh
congestion charge. It also considers the problems of boundary effects, especially
the issue of spillover parking as people park on street at the edge of the conges-
tion charge zone to avoid payment. Exemptions are a strategy to ameliorate some
of the equity impacts and make projects more acceptable.
Fridstrom et al. (2000) tested a number of first-best and second-best pricing
strategies for three scenarios: Edinburgh, Helsinki and Oslo. Prior to revenue
recycling, consumers were worse off, but there were positive welfare gains over-
all as the operator’s gains exceeded consumers’ losses. In the long-term pricing
could reverse urban sprawl, and by increasing density make urban public trans-
port more economically viable with increased economies of scale and increased
riderships as travellers switch away from auto. A poll transfer of excess revenue
(returning the money equally to all individuals) benefits the poor more than the
wealthy, and not all money need be reimbursed in order to ensure a Pareto-
improving scenario, just enough so that the poorest group is better off, leaving
additional revenue which can be used in other ways. Looking at the question of
spatial accessibility, pricing diminishes accessibility by car (using generalized
cost, clearly if it improves travel time, time-based accessibility should increase),
but increases accessibility by public transit (Fridstrom et al., 2000).
Teubel examines the effect of introducing road pricing on commuters in Dres-
den, Germany. As is commonly found, in the absence of revenue recycling “All
measures indicate that the welfare is distributed more unequally after the intro-
duction of road pricing than before. Both components of the welfare changes
analysed before contribute to this effect. The toll itself as well as the travel time
gains separately enlarge inequality.” (2000, p. 249) Revenue recycling can remedy
the inequity provided the toll collection costs are not too high.
Anderson and Mohring (1997) finds from a transportation network model that
while a hypothetical comprehensive road pricing system in the Twin Cities
would improve system efficiency, it will make most travellers worse off unless
revenue is recycled. Mohring (1999) extended the analysis to consider difference
by income category. Without revenue recycling under severe congestion, incomes
needed to exceed $80 000 for travellers to experience welfare increases.
Johnston and Rodier (1999) running simulation experiments on the Sacramento,
California region found from a user welfare measure that pricing would have a
detrimental effect on low-income households but positive for middle- and high-
income categories in the absence of revenue recycling. Some strategies for invest-
ing the revenue in transit could produce positive benefits for all groups.
Testing a proposal to combine day-of-week rationing with tolls to buy out of
the rationing, Nakamura and Kockelman state it will be “very difficult to provide
a Pareto-improving policy for [the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge] via pricing
and rationing” (2002, p. 411) and without revenue recycling, as had been theoreti-






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 43
much greater than the simulation found. From an equity perspective, the scheme
was most beneficial under pure rationing, with mixed rationing and pricing
harming the lowest income group.
Road pricing of various kinds is being seriously considered in the Seattle region
because the high congestion levels due to topology and economic growth. Tolling
across bridges to pay for their reconstruction, and more systematic approaches
have been debated.
Dill and Weinstein (2007) reports: 
A poll of Washington state residents found that more people felt that tolls
were fairer than increasing the gas tax if more funds were needed.
Respondents who were specially asked about fairness to lower income
groups felt even more strongly, with 52% indicating that tolls were fairer
than increased gas taxes (27%). (Lawrence, 2006, p. 348)
Franklin (2006) focuses on the issue of vertical equity, distribution between
groups. He simulates in a stylized way proposed charges on the Washington State
Route 520 Bridge connecting Seattle to Bellevue, assuming alternatives are also
tolled, and testing the tolls for the morning peak period so that most trips are
work-related, leaving mode as the primary substitution effect. The regressiveness
of tolling will tend to be understated when excluding the income effect, but even
without redistribution a toll may be Pareto-improving because the wealthy have a
higher value of time.
Kitchen (2008) describes a pilot experiment conducted in the Puget Sound
region using 400 in-vehicle GPS-based tolling, where tolls would be assessed
across the network (not on every street, but on major streets and highways). The
households were all given a travel endowment, which would be drawn upon to
pay tolls, and for which the remainder would remain with the household. They
found value of time rose with wage rate, from about $10 per hour for the lowest
income group to $60 per hour for households making $150 000 per year or more.
The study estimated the region would be able to raise about $3 billion per year,
which compares with $500 million per year from gas taxes at current rates
(though clearly annual administrative costs would be much higher from 1% for
gas taxes to up to 8% for network tolling, excluding initial capital expenditures).
The study suggests the large revenue collected could be used to ensure fairness.
Maruyama and Sumalee (2007) compares cordon and area pricing schemes,
(where a cordon toll requires payment each crossing, while an area-based toll
requires payment once per day) testing the cases on a simulation of Utsunomiya,
Japan, with a finding that while the area scheme has greater welfare than a
cordon (and a higher optimal toll), it also has greater inequity. Larger coverage of
either system increased welfare and greater tolls decreased equity.
Safirova et al. (2004) considers short-run distributional effects from three pric-
ing scenarios for Washington DC: HOT lanes, limited congestion pricing (on all
freeway segments that have High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes), and
comprehensive congestion pricing (on all freeway segments) modelled in their
START model. HOT lanes are most equitable, with benefits accruing to all
income groups even before recycling, while achieving between 77% and 83% of
the efficiency benefits associated with comprehensive road pricing, writing “ …
HOV lanes, which have disappointed their many advocates, may end up being a























































Safirova et al. (2006) considers longer-term responses to policy, such as changes
in land use and the location of jobs and residences. Urban economic theory
assuming a monocentric city predicts that long-run effects of comprehensive
congestion pricing reduces the physical size of the city (i.e. increasing density).
However more sophisticated models suggest that industry may leave the central
core, and thus pricing might have a decentralizing effect. While workers may
select commutes with shorter travel times in response to congestion charges,
there is no guarantee that either workers or firms move toward the centre.
Safirova  et al.  (2006) models cordon tolls in Washington, DC extending their
START model with the LUSTRE model. When considering land use effects, opti-
mal (welfare maximizing) tolls are higher then when considering only transpor-
tation effects. However, as noted by Parry and Bento (2001), pricing without
appropriate revenue recycling leads to higher wages but higher unemployment.
Unlike that paper, the authors still found welfare gains even with lump-sum
redistribution.
Looking a bit farther afield, some theoretical studies have examined hypotheti-
cal networks of private roads, and compared those with a scenario of publicly
owned roads. This is important to consider what might occur should road privati-
zation become more widespread, as evidence suggests this is gaining additional
credence with many new toll roads being privately owned and some states (e.g.
Indiana) selling, or considering selling (e.g. Pennsylvania, New Jersey) their turn-
pike systems. Zhang and Levinson (2005) find that under private autonomous
links, the disparity in accessibility is much greater than under centralized control.
Zhang et al. (2008) uses coupled agent-based travel demand and link investment
models to examine the effects of product differentiation in a network of private
roads. Generally (and assuming no recycling as these are private roads), “users
with the lowest value of time harvest the least benefit (or suffer the most loss)
from road pricing and investment decisions.”
Simulation studies of within metropolitan road charging generally find that
pricing properly implemented improves efficiency, but may harm equity (across a
variety of dimensions, but particularly in harming low-income travellers) in a
way that revenue recycling is required to remedy. A variety of revenue recycling
strategies have been tested, these are discussed more below.
National Road Pricing
Steininger et al. (2007) use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach to
model private transportation in Austria with road pricing. Their model suggests
that road pricing is in fact progressive, poorer households would bear a smaller
burden than wealthier households (this is in terms of money spent, not share of
income, for which poor people generally spend a greater share on transport than
wealthier). This is because poorer households spend less money on transportation
in general, and use public transport more. It is noted that to be effective, redistri-
bution of revenue needs to be independent of use, or it negates the benefits of
road pricing.
The proposed national road user charge in England has been examined
(Glaister and Graham, 2005, 2006), finding that if revenues are recycled through a
reduction in the fuel tax, benefits accrue to rural more than urban residents, in
contrast with the current situation in England (with its high fuel tax) where rural
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Bonsall et al. (2007) considers the proposed UK national road pricing scheme.
The system is a national, largely distance-based charge. Concerns arise because of
the prospective complexity of the scheme (which may raise difficulties for travel-
lers without the ability to appropriately deal with the complexity and who find
such complexity frustrating). It is especially pertinent as drivers are often
unaware of the distances they travel, leading to charges perhaps being perceived
as surprises. Further, if charges are higher as well in certain areas (congestion
charging), the exact formula may be difficult to discern.
Whitty and Imholt (2005) describes the proposed Oregon distance-based road
user fee, extending some of the pioneering methods developed in Oregon from
charging trucks (Oregon was also the first state to impose the gas tax).7 A
distance-based charge is more equitable than existing gas taxes according to the
benefit principle, costs are tied to benefits received, though of course as with any
disruption will create winners and losers.
Forkenbrock (2005) advocates a move toward mileage-based road user charges,
ultimately a national scheme for the USA. Forkenbrock (2006) is critical of using
electronic tolls on selected arterials and highways, noting the equity issue of
double payment, as those tolls may be in addition to already collected motor fuel
taxes. Further, if tolls only collected on part of the system pay for the entire
system, horizontal inequity may result.
Distance-based charging implemented at a state or national level raises a
number of questions not asked of metropolitan- or facility-based schemes. They
generally involve in-vehicle GPS units, and provide the potential for more inten-
sive vehicle tracking by time and location. While such charging may better apply
the benefit principle (getting what you pay for), whether they adversely affect
lower-income travellers is unclear. There will be clear geographical disruptions,
though again, this may not be an equity problem, but rather the change may
reduce an existing inequity where one area or class underpays relative to use.
Owners of smaller fuel efficient cars will pay more, while owners of larger cars
will pay less compared with a fuel tax.
Implementation
An issue related to equity is that of implementation. Inequity or perceived ineq-
uity may reduce public acceptability either because of genuine public discomfort
associated with unfairness or as a smokescreen for other issues. Identifying
winners and losers differs from equity considerations unless one takes the status
quo as perfectly equitable. A new system may create losers, but still be more equi-
table if the losers were better off on some dimension on the previous system.
These issues are discussed in turn.
Public Acceptability
Studies of acceptability have been widespread in the field of road pricing, as it is
the political concerns, rather than their economic efficacy that have held back
implementation (Odeck and Brathen, 1997; Truelove, 1998; Padam and Wijkmark,
2000; Link and Polak, 2003; Marini and Marcucci, 2003; Schade and Schlag, 2003;
Whittles, 2003; Jaensirisak et al., 2005). Ungemah (2007) provides a practical set of
questions to consider when examining the equity implications of various road pric-























































from a number of surveys suggest “Support for pricing options was not clearly
related to income or ethnicity, as might be expected based upon the debates over
equity” (2007, p. 354) because the alternatives such as sales taxes are clearly less
equitable. Lyons et al. (2004) survey a wide-span of international evidence on the
acceptability of road pricing finds acceptance rises “when the revenues are hypoth-
ecated to the development of transport generally”.
In a survey of Sweden, Japan and Taiwan about perceptions of pricing,
perceived fairness was higher in Japan and Taiwan than Japan, and acceptance
depends on perceived fairness, which was the most important factor (Fujii et al.,
2004). Different cultures respond differently to the social dilemma that congestion
poses, a decision that is selfishly rational may be detrimental to society.
Raje (2003) conducted a series of focus groups analysing a potential city-centre
road pricing scheme in Bristol, England, interviewing groups that are potentially
socially excluded (ethnic minorities, non-English speakers, elderly and young).
The author concludes “[P]ublic acceptability of road user charging will be directly
related to its perceived effects on local residents.” Recycling the revenue to local
transport initiatives would be important in addressing issues of fairness of the
system to socially at-risk groups and thereby promoting social inclusion, but car-
based transport will still be important for many members of these groups, and
taxi and paratransit should be considered as possible recipients of recycled reve-
nues. Lucas et al. (2001) found that even non-drivers opposed the then-proposed
scheme in Bristol.
Schweitzer and Taylor (2008) find local option sales taxes, which are popular in
California as a mechanism for transportation financing to be more regressive than
congestion charging. “The fuel tax is regressive with respect to income, but
progressive with respect to highway use” since users of highways with more
expensive (and less fuel-efficient) vehicles pay more. Sales taxes in particular
penalize non-users. This finding of popularity despite inequity is important for
understanding the context of political acceptability.
Assessing Winners and Losers
In the general analysis of transportation, mobility is considered a good for those
experiencing it (they always have the choice not to consume mobility). Ceteris
paribus, any reduction in mobility (or increase in cost) for those individuals (e.g.
due to road pricing), will be perceived by them as a ‘bad’. That is not to say that
private mobility is necessarily a social good, as mobility generally produces nega-
tive externalities. Thus, a reduction in private mobility may also reduce negative
externalities, and depending on specific conditions may net out as a social good.8
Winners and losers can be identified from road pricing schemes, the literature
has identified some classes, e.g. Gomez-Ibanez (1992); Langmyhr (1997); Hau
(2005); Kitchen (2008), Table 1 below extends that. While Table 1 identifies the
gains and losses among travellers, Lo et al. (1996) develop a taxonomy of effects
by System Users (stratified by income, mode, gender, geography, trip purpose
and cause (those who cause congestion)), Transportation Service Providers and
Society. There are other groups who win or lose, most notably the agency collect-
ing the revenue, and those who might benefit from recycled revenue.
Often categories must be considered simultaneously, e.g. the effects of income
may be ambiguous depending on auto ownership. Many low-income travellers






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 47
recycling if the money is invested in transit modes), while those low-income trav-
ellers who do use a car spend an above average share of income on travel (Metz,
2008).
Table 2 provides a matrix that can be used to check if particular equity
outcomes (in the columns) for different population groups have been considered,
and to assess whether an outcome affects groups differently. One could consider
this kind of equity impact checklist for each considered pricing strategy, as
suggested by Lo et al. (1996) (though perhaps not for all 90 pricing strategies
identified in Figure 1). Each row represents a different way of grouping the
population: as a whole, by location or jurisdiction, by current vs. future residents,
by mode usage, by age group, by sex, by race or ethnicity, by (dis-)ability, by
cultural background, or by income. In most analysis of road pricing, income and
mode usage are primary categories, and some analyses look at location and
current vs. future residents. Each column represents an outcome, the first
concerns participation in the decision process, other outcomes are mobility,




Travelers valuing the time savings 
higher than the fee.
Travellers valuing the time savings 
below the fee, but having only 
unattractive travel alternatives.
Changed to toll 
facility (tolled on)
Persons now finding it profitable to 
undertake trip (or change trip timing, 
route, or mode choice,) even with a fee 
because the travel time will be reduced.
Changed from toll 
facility (tolled off)
Travellers who switch from driving to 
bus or HOV services which are now 
better because of lower congestion.
Persons abstaining from travel or 
changing to less attractive travel 
times, routes or modes to avoid fee.
Unchanged, fee 
not charged
Public transport and HOV users 
experiencing time savings.
Persons experiencing congestion on 
road or on public transport caused 
by persons who have changed 
travel behavior to avoid fee.
Source: Extended version originally developed by Langmyhr (1997, 28)
Table 2. Equity impact checklist


































































economic, environmental and health. Road pricing applications directly consider
mobility outcomes, some pricing analysis consider economic outcomes, and this
study is interested in environmental effects. One could populate the outcome
measures on the checklist with some summary equity measure as described
above to quickly flag any equity concerns.
Recycling the Revenue
Many strategies have been proposed to use the revenue raised from congestion
pricing with the notional aim of relieving inequity, but also the political aim of
increasing public acceptability. The first cost is paying for the implementation of
the system, which is much costlier than gas taxes (Levinson and Odlyzko, 2008).
The remaining funds may be used for general revenue, additional road invest-
ments (either near where the tolls were collected or otherwise), or additional tran-
sit investments to help encourage modal shift (both through the higher monetary
cost of road travel and the better service provided by alternatives, which in the
case of bus transport can take advantage of the faster road speeds as well), or
returned to users in some other fashion. In general different ways of recycling will
also have different equity outcomes for different population groups and areas.
Currently in England, fuel taxes go into the general fund (and are high enough
to account for 10% of total tax revenue, far exceeding the amount spent on roads).
Newbery and Santos argue in favour of earmarking (hypothecating or ring-fencing)
fuel tax revenue for use in the road sector, as is done in the USA with the Highway
Trust Fund. They call for a three-way allocation of road taxes: one part of road user
charges dedicated to paying for roads, a second part paying for environmental
damages, and a third part which is revenue raising. They write: 
The political attractions of green taxes are obvious they are likely to
command more support than other kinds of taxes, as they cloak the pain-
ful process of extracting revenue in a mantle of virtue and provide a salve
for guilt. The main economic advantage of taxes that reflect the marginal
damage is that they leave the user to decide how best to respond, rather
than forcing him or her to make one particular kind of decision. (1999,
p. 117)
There are limits to the ability of imposing taxes to encourage virtuous behav-
iour, in England the fuel-duty escalator ended after protests (Smith, 2000;
Doherty  et al., 2003). Distinguishing green taxes is important, but difficult as
accounting for the full costs of transportation, including determining the capital
value of infrastructure (which is historically valued at less than replacement
cost, potentially leading to under-investment), has not generally been performed
in a systematic way. Just as fuel taxes might be hypothecated to the road sector,
the same argument can be made for road tolls.
Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002) address the question raised by
Lave (1994) “Why is the world reluctant to do the obvious?” arguing “marginal
cost pricing does not prevail throughout the economy, the information cost of
determining Pigouvian taxes are likely to be considerable, and there is ample
evidence that policymakers do not maximize social welfare.” The authors warn
that prices can crowd out ‘intrinsic motivation’ so that people who were previ-






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 49
Unfortunately the public tends to overestimate the effectiveness of many behav-
iours that result from intrinsic motivation (e.g. rewards for carpooling or using
public transportation). Charges should avoid displacing people’s underlying
motives. The paper also argues that effective compensation should be in same
dimension as the perceived losses from the charge. Thus if people lose the ability
to travel in the peak, they should be compensated by easier travel at other times.
Implicitly this argument is in favour of pricing credits of some kind.
Revenue-Neutral Congestion Pricing
Dial (1999) developed the idea of a minimal-revenue congestion pricing, that is,
finding a pricing scheme that would replicate the demand resulting from
marginal cost prices everywhere while ensuring the total revenue raised was zero
(so many links might have a zero toll). From an equity and acceptability perspec-
tive, keeping the revenue raised to a minimum need to accomplish the stated
ends is important to minimize any distortionary impacts and the perception of
gauging. Nevertheless, it is likely that there will be some positive revenue from
road pricing, and how to distribute that is an essential question.
Adler and Cetin (2001) proposes that money collected on a more desirable route
be redirected to travellers on a less desirable route, in a sense paying people to
help achieve a socially optimal assignment, using the revenue to help ensure a
socially optimal solution. Levinson and Rafferty (2004) proposes similarly that
delayers (those at the front of the queue who impose a higher marginal cost on
others) compensate those at the back of the queue, who suffer congestion, and
thereby help spread the peak.
Fast and Intertwined Regular (FAIR) Lanes (DeCorla-Souza, 2005; DeCorla-
Souza and Barker, 2005) would divide congested freeways into untolled (and
congested) lanes and tolled (and uncongested) lanes. Drivers who were not using
the toll lanes would earn credits that could be applied periodically to the toll lanes.
Credit-based pricing (Kockelman and Kalmanje, 2005) would return tolls from
marginal cost pricing in the form of credits that could be applied to toll facilities.
Individuals who drive less than average make a net profit, those who drive longer
and more often in peak period than average pay more.
All such strategies, by mitigating the inequity that pricing might cause, should
improve political acceptability compared with an approach where revenue
collected went into a general fund account. Recycling in this manner does
however potentially increase the administrative burden of the system.
Building Winning Coalitions
Button (2006) looks at alternative uses of the money raised by pricing with the
hope of finding a winning coalition of supporters for such a change. Goodwin
(1989) came up with the rule of three, allocating revenue to roads, transit and
reduced taxes, though not necessarily in equal shares, and Small (1992) makes a
similar point. The question of earmarking arises as a way to help ensure support
and show taxpayers that the money raised will be spent on something they desire,
but which may not be economically efficient.
Small (1983) in an early simulated analysis of the effects of road pricing by
income class uses a queueing model and a logit mode choice model to understand























































as while they paid more tolls, they had a higher value of time and saved more
time. However once revenue was recycled, every income group benefitted, assum-
ing congestion was sufficiently severe.
Mayeres and Proost (2002) use the idea of Pareto-frontier to trade-off efficiency
against equity in road pricing, and only consider changes to financing acceptable
when they are Pareto-improving. This requires comparison of absolute utility
levels across individuals, which is a theoretical difficulty. On the Pareto Equity-
Efficiency Frontier, it is impossible to improve one individual’s utility without
worsening another’s. The authors use CGE model of Belgium to argue that reve-
nue recycling is required to achieve equity across income groups when a
marginal social cost pricing regime is instituted.
Solving Societal Problems
To address broader social equity concerns (that is, to use transport policies to
address societal inequities, not just transportation inequities or the marginal ineq-
uities associated with a change in transport policy), Nash (2003) argues for use of
distributive weighting systems making use of Ramsey pricing (Ramsey, 1927)9
while retaining marginal social cost pricing as a starting point, following the ideas
laid out in (Feldstein, 1972). This however may not fully recover costs.
Parry and Bento (2001) considers the issue of how road pricing affects labour
force participation. Theory suggests higher commuting costs will discourage the
marginal commuter (the cost of the toll exceeds the benefit of congestion reduc-
tion for most travellers), and in most of the authors’ numerical simulations, the
welfare gains from road pricing (internalizing congestion costs) is less than the
efficiency cost in the labour market. The authors suggest recycling the revenue to
reduce labour taxes, offsetting the penalty associated with road prices and that
this is more effective than providing transit subsidies or providing a lump-sum
payment to households (which does not encourage labour force participation).
Lindsey (2003), citing (Nix, 2001), notes that the Maritime provinces have
resisted tolls because of spatial equity and double taxation rationales. He further
identifies the issue of spillover effects on customers of firms that have located
based on a particular assumption about the costs of freight, which post-tolling
would see their cost structure change, citing (Lake et al., 1999).
Levine and Garb (2002) argues that traditional congestion pricing policies are
mobility based, and thus may lead to spatial deconcentration as prices discourage
driving to congested areas. The authors suggest tolls be redistributed to enhance
accessibility (the ability to reach places) rather than mobility (the ability to move
on the network).
Evans (1992) notes the redistribution aspects of road pricing may drown the
efficiency gains. Minimizing congestion and minimizing emissions can be at odds
(Rilett and Benedek, 1994). First-best marginal social cost congestion pricing do
not necessarily reduce emissions, but there is a toll pattern which does (Yin and
Lawphongpanich, 2006).
Discussion and Conclusions
The trade-off between efficiency and equity emerges naturally as systems mature,
as users compete over the allocation of scarce resources rather than growing the






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 51
achieve process equity, transparency in the decision-making process, in addition
to allowing input from all potentially affected individuals or groups representing
them, is required. Examples, some of which have been discussed in this paper,
include: 
● tolling (us vs. them, here vs. there, local vs. through)
● free parking (drivers vs. riders)
● facility siting/investment (here vs. there, rich neighbourhood vs. poor, black
vs. white)
● bus vs. rail (operating vs. capital)
● cost allocation (cars vs. trucks, general aviation vs. commercial aviation)
● modal allocation (roads vs. transit)
● infrastructure finance (now vs. later, here vs. there)
● environmental regulations (man vs. nature)
● age, gender, ability
Because of past experience, citizens will remain sceptical of claims about road
pricing projects. The Pareto maxim, that so long as the losers could theoretically be
compensated by the winners, the project is worthwhile, cannot be used as a polit-
ical justification, actual compensation is required. In the absence of such compen-
sation, political opposition will continue to rise and new construction will continue
to be more and more difficult. Viegas (2001) posits that the reluctance of politicians
to adopt road pricing despite receiving ideas along these lines suggest they are
“seeing dimensions of the problem that the economists are not considering.”
The perception of equity is highly subjective. A project that may appear equita-
ble to an analyst across one set of dimensions may not to individuals affected by
the project. Achieving consensus on decisions (thereby ensuring people believe
the decision was equitable) may involve departure from objective ‘engineering’
rationality, moving into the realm of politics. The issue is further complicated
because equity concerns may mask opposition motivated by other reasons
(Giuliano, 1994).
Resolving the equity vs. efficiency problem requires a recognition that in
complex, politically driven, mature systems like transportation, equity is efficiency.
Without satisfying potential constituent groups, nothing can be accomplished. An
example of this is the recent failure of the road pricing initiative in Manchester,
England and the controversy about even studying a national road user charge in
England (Richards, 2008). Logrolling, as described by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962), recognizes the political efficiency under representative democracies for
satisfying multiple groups. Side payments of cash or as an in-kind subsidy,
bargaining, bundling of projects,10  and buying-off losing groups, or in the
language of road pricing, revenue recycling, may be necessary to achieve consen-
sus about acceptability, achieving a package that is considered win/win by the
relevant players.
Employing a community impact assessment/environmental justice approach,
and using a tool such as the equity impact checklist described in Table 2, it will be
possible to identify which neighbourhoods and groups will be most affected by
road pricing, through reduced road accessibility, and which have good alternatives.
Strategies developed with the local community may help find appropriate compen-
sation solutions, such as suggested by King et al. (2007), to these problems to enable























































From an equity perspective, HOT lanes are the pricing strategy least likely to
raise public concerns, especially if it involves conversion of underutilized HOV
lanes or construction of new lanes without taking new right-of-way. While there
is a slight bias in use towards wealthier individuals, all travellers benefit from
the additional usable capacity, and the revenue can be recycled to benefit transit
users in the corridor. However, these are not as effective as more extreme pricing
that is more comprehensive at the urban or national level. More comprehensive
pricing (at the metropolitan, and especially at the national level) is not optional
in the same way as HOT lanes with parallel free lanes are. Thus it raises more
equity issues as to avoid the toll, drivers must switch modes, destinations, or
time of day. Revenue recycling offers a way of ameliorating adverse equity
impacts.
Both the efficiency and equity of any proposed road charge depends on the
travel market for which the charge is proposed. Moreover, what is acceptable in
Europe may not be in North America or vice versa. The degree of alternatives
(e.g. alternative modes or destinations), the distribution of income and allocation
of time by residents will all affect the ultimate conclusion, and some markets will
inevitably be more amenable than others to different schemes.
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Notes
1. Though gasoline consumption is a good proxy for carbon emissions, it ties less perfectly with
other pollutants, and more importantly is not correlated with the health damages which depend
on where the fuel is burned and the rate of intake of those pollutants.
2. Levinson (2000, 2001) examined the issue of using tolls as a form of tax exporting. By placing tolls
at boundaries, jurisdictions can ensure that out-of-jurisdiction (e.g. out-of-state) residents pay for
their use of the road, and perhaps more than their fair share, in contrast to a system of gas taxes
where out-of-jurisdiction residents may never pay their costs (if they buy gas where they live
rather than where they drive) and would instead free ride on the road system.
3. The development of first-best pricing is generally credited to (Pigou, 1912), who argues that
resources can be most efficiently allocated by setting the price equal to the social marginal cost.
This argument depends on a number of assumptions, many of which either don’t hold or are diffi-
cult to ensure in practice, leading to the development of second-best pricing strategies.
4. Pigou did not deal with dynamics of charging across a period of time, which awaited the develop-
ment of Vickrey’s bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1965; Arnott et al., 1993). Xin and Levinson (2006)
distinguishes between omniscient pricing  (where the toll operator knows both schedule delay
penalties and desired arrival times) and observable pricing (where the toll operator can observe only
delay). It is the latter which is more realistic given information availability, but it may not fully























































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 53
5. These annual reports can be downloaded from the TfL webpage at http://www.tfl.gov.uk/road-
users/congestioncharging/6722.aspx.
6. The origin of the term ‘Lexus lane’ is unclear, but a brief article on the subject can be found at Toll
Road News: http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/2143, attributing the term to Seattle-based
HOV advocate Heidi Stamm.
7. The 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study found that because heavy vehicles impose road
damage disproportionate to their fuel taxes, they underpay compared to other classes of vehicles,
and are thus cross-subsidized (Forkenbrock, 2005).
8. One might speculate that policies like road pricing may result in attitudinal and behavioural
changes embodied in decisions not to travel, or to travel less, thereby changing the shape of the
demand curve for travel, and so less travel might not be a bad for those travellers; those specu-
lated outcomes have yet to be observed.
9. Ramsey pricing charges users in proportion to willingness to pay, using price discrimination to
differentiate customers by their elasticity of demand, constrained to recover some amount of
money.
10. Bundling ensures that not only is there a net benefit (when all projects are considered together),
the number of winners exceeds the number of losers by a significant amount.
References
Adler, J. and Cetin, M. (2001) A direct redistribution model of congestion pricing,  Transportation
Research Part B, 35(5), pp. 447–460.
Anderson, D. and Mohring, H. (1997) Congestion costs and congestion pricing, in: D. L. Greene, D. W.
Jones and M. Delucchi (Eds) The Full Costs and Benefits of Transportation: Contributions to Theory,
Method and Measurement, pp. 315–336 (New York: Springer).
Arnott, R., de Palma, A. and Lindsey, R. (1993) A Structural model of peak-period congestion: a traffic
bottleneck with elastic demand, The American Economic Review, pp. 161–179 (Northampton, MA:
Edward Elgar).
Banister, D. (1994) Equity and acceptability questions in internalising the social costs of transport,
Internalising the Social Costs of Transport, pp. 153–175 (Paris: OECD).
Banister, D. (2002) The integration of road pricing with land use planning. Paper presented at the 2nd
seminar of the IMPRINT-EUROPE Thematic Network: Implementing Reform on Transport Pricing:
Identifying Mode-Specific Issues, Brussels, 14–15 May.
Bonsall, P. and Kelly, C. (2005) Road user charging and social exclusion: the impact of congestion
charges on at-risk groups, Transport Policy, 12(5), pp. 406–418.
Bonsall, P., Shires, J., Maule, J., Matthews, B. and Beale, J. (2007) Responses to complex pricing signals:
theory, evidence and implications for road pricing, Transportation Research Part A, 41(7), pp. 672–683.
Brekke, K. (1997) The numeraire matters in cost-benefit analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 64(1),
pp. 117–123.
Brekke, K., Lura, H. and Nyborg, K. (1996) Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare,
Journal of Economics, 63(3), pp. 303–324.
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus Consent of (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press).
Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J. and Piachaud, D. (1999) Social exclusion in Britain 1991–1995, Social Policy
and Administration, 33(3), pp. 227–244.
Burris, M. and Appiah, J. (2004) Examination of Houston’s QuickRide participants by frequency of
quickride usage, Transportation Research Record, 1864, pp. 22–30.
Burris, M. and Hannay, R. (2003) Equity analysis of the Houston, Texas, QuickRide project, Transportation
Research Record, 1859, pp. 87–92.
Button, K. (2006) How should the revenues from congestion pricing be spent, in: G. Roth, (Ed) Street
Smart: Competition, Entrepreneurship and the Future of Roads, pp. 225–242 (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction).
Daganzo, C. (1995) A Pareto optimum congestion reduction scheme, Transportation Research Part B,
29(2), pp. 139–154.
DeCorla-Souza, P. and Barker, W. (2005) Innovative public-private partnership models for road
pricing/BRT initiatives, Journal of Public Transportation, 8(1), p. 78.
DeCorla-Souza, P. (2005) Fair highway networks: a new approach to eliminate congestion on metro-
politan freeways, Public Works Management & Policy, 9(3), p. 196.
Dial, R. (1999) Minimal-revenue congestion pricing Part I: a fast algorithm for the single-origin case,























































Dill, J. and Weinstein, A. (2007) How to pay for transportation? a survey of public preferences in
California, Transport Policy, 14(4), pp. 346–356.
Doherty, B., Paterson, M., Plows, A. and Wall, D. (2003) Explaining the fuel protests 1, British Journal of
Politics and International Relations, 5(1), pp. 1–23.
Douma, F., Zmud, J. and Patterson, T. (2005) Pricing Comes to Minnesota: Attitudinal Evaluation of I-394
HOT Lane Project. Technical report (University of Minnesota, MN: Humphrey Institute of Public
Affairs).
Eliasson, J. and Mattsson, L. (2006) Equity effects of congestion pricing quantitative methodology and
a case study for Stockholm, Transportation Research Part A, 40(7), pp. 602–620.
Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (1994) Executive
Order 12898 about Environmental Justice (Washington, DC: United States Environmental Protection
Agency). Available at: http://www.epa.govfedrgstr/eo/eo12898.htm (accessed 7 September 2009).
Evans, A. (1992) Road congestion pricing: when is it a good policy? Journal of Transport Economics and
Policy, 26, pp. 213–213.
Feldstein, M. (1972) Distributional equity and the optimal structure of public prices,  American
Economic Review, 62(1), pp. 32–36.
Flynn, M. (2006) Moving it forward: a blueprint for making road pricing a reality in New York City.
Master’s thesis, Graduate Center for Planning and the Environment, Pratt Institute.
Forkenbrock, D. (2005) Implementing a mileage-based road user charge, Public Works Management &
Policy, 10(2), p. 87.
Forkenbrock, D. (2006) Financing local roads: current problems and new paradigm, Transportation
Research Record, 1960, pp. 8–14.
Forkenbrock, D. and Schweitzer, L. (1999) Environmental justice in transportation planning, Journal of
the American Planning Association, 65(1), pp. 96–112.
Foster, C. (1974) The regressiveness of road pricing, International Journal of Transport Economics, 1(2),
pp. 133–141.
Foster, C. (1975) A note on the distributional effects of road pricing: a comment, Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, 9, pp. 186–187.
Franklin, J. (2006) The equity effects of roadway tolls: an application of Hicksian welfare measures
with income effects. Paper presented at the international conference on Travel Behaviour Research
Vol. 1 of Conference Paper Workshop 2.4, Kyoto, Japan, 16–20 August.
Fridstrom, L., Minken, H., Moilanen, P., Shepherd, S. and Vold, A. (2000) Economic and Equity Effects of
Marginal Cost Pricing in Transport: Case studies from three European cities. Technical report (Helsinki:
Government Institute for Economic Research).
Fujii, S., Garling, T., Jakobsson, C. and Jou, R. (2004) A cross-country study of fairness and infringe-
ment on freedom as determinants of car owners’ acceptance of road pricing, Transportation, 31(3),
pp. 285–295.
Giuliano, G. (1994) Equity and fairness considerations of congestion pricing. Curbing gridlock,
peak-period fees to relieve traffic congestion,  Transportation Research Board Special Report,  242,
pp. 250–279.
Glaister, S. and Graham, D. (2005) An evaluation of national road user charging in England, Transpor-
tation Research Part A, 39(7–9), pp. 632–650.
Glaister, S. and Graham, D. (2006) Road Pricing in Great Britain: Winners and Losers. Technical report
(London: Independent Transport Commission).
Goh, M. (2002) Congestion management and electronic road pricing in Singapore, Journal of Transport
Geography, 10(1), pp. 29–38.
Gomez-Ibanez, J. (1992) The political economy of highway tolls and congestion pricing, Transportation
Quarterly, 46(3), pp. 343–360.
Goodwin, P. (1989) The ‘rule of three’: a possible solution to the political problem of competing objec-
tives for road pricing, Traffic Engineering and Control, 30(10), pp. 495–497.
Hau, T. (2005) Economic fundamentals of road pricing: a diagrammatic analysis, part I-fundamentals,
Transportmetrica, 1, pp. 81–117.
Illich, I. (1974) Energy and Equity (London: Calder & Boyars).
Ison, S. (1998) The saleability of urban road pricing, Economic Affairs, 18(4), pp. 21–25.
Ison, S. and Rye, T. (2005) Implementing road user charging: the lessons learnt from Hong Kong,
Cambridge and Central London, Transport Reviews, 25(4), pp. 451–465.
Jaensirisak, S., Wardman, M. and May, A. (2005) Explaining variations in public acceptability of road
pricing schemes, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 39(2), pp. 127–153.
Johnston, R. and Rodier, C. (1999) Synergisms among land use, transit, and travel pricing policies,






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 55
Jones, P. (2001) Addressing equity concerns in relation to road user charging. Paper presented at the
CUPID-PROGRESS Workshop on Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies, Trondheim,
Norway, April.
Jones, P. (2003) Acceptability of transport pricing strategies: meeting the challenge, in: J. Schade
and B. Schlag (Eds)  Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies,  pp. 27–62 (Oxford: Elsevier
Science).
King, D., Manville, M. and Shoup, D. (2007) The political calculus of congestion pricing, Transport
Policy, 14(2), pp. 111–123.
Kitchen, M. (2008) Traffic Choices Study: Summary Report. Technical report (Seattle, WA: Washington
State Transportation Commission, Puget Sound Regional Council).
Kockelman, K. and Kalmanje, S. (2005) Credit-based congestion pricing: a policy proposal and the
public response, Transportation Research Part A, 39(7–9), pp. 671–690.
Lake, R., Hirshtorn, R., Barton, R., Schwier, C., Tardif, L.-P. and Hackston, D. (1999) Road Pricing and
Climate Change. Phase 1: Needs Assessment. Technical report (Canada: Ministry of Public Works and
Government Services).
Langmyhr, T. (1997) Managing equity: the case of road pricing, Transport Policy, 4(1), pp. 25–39.
Lave, C. (1994) The demand curve under road pricing and the problem of political feasibility, Trans-
portation Research: Part A, Policy and Practice, 28(2), pp. 83–91.
Lawrence, G. (2006) A Two-Phase Study of Attitudes of Washington State Voters Toward Transportation
Issues.  Technical report (Washington, DC: Lawrence Research, Prepared for Washington State
Transportation Commission).
Levine, J. and Garb, Y. (2002) Congestion pricing’s conditional promise: promotion of accessibility or
mobility? Transport Policy, 9(3), pp. 179–188.
Levinson, D. (2000) Revenue choice on a serial network, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 34(1),
pp. 69–98.
Levinson, D. (2001) Why states toll: an empirical model of finance choice, Journal of Transport Economics
and Policy, 35(2), pp. 223–238.
Levinson, D. (2002) Identifying winners and losers in transportation, Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 1812, pp. 179–185.
Levinson, D. (2005) Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: a game theory perspective, Transpor-
tation Research Part A, 39(7–9), pp. 691–704.
Levinson, D. and Odlyzko, A. (2008) Too expensive to meter: the influence of transaction costs in
transportation and communication, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences, 366(1872), pp. 2033–2046.
Levinson, D. and Rafferty, P. (2004) Delayer pays principle: examining congestion pricing with
compensation, International Journal of Transport Economics, 31(3), pp. 295–311.
Lindsey, R. (2003) Road Pricing Issue and Experiences in the US and Canada. Technical report (Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Alberta). Paper prepared for IMPRINT-EUROPE 4th Seminar
Implementing Pricing Policies in Transport: Phasing and Packaging, Katholieke University of
Leuven, Belgium, 13–14 May.
Link, H. and Polak, J. (2003) Acceptability of transport pricing measures among public and professionals
in Europe, Transportation Research Record, 1839, pp. 34–44.
Lo, H., Hickman, M. and Walstad, M. (1996) An Evaluation Taxonomy for Congestion Pricing. California
PATH Program. Reseach Report No. UCB-ITS-PRR-96-10 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Transportation
Studies, University of California).
Lucas, K., Grosvenor, T. and Simpson, R. (2001) Transport, the Environment and Social Exclusion (York,
UK: Joseph Rowntree Foundation).
Lyons, G., Dudley, G., Slater, E. and Parkhurst, G. (2004) Evidence-Based Review: Attitudes to Road
Pricing, Technical Report (London: Department for Transport).
Marini, M. and Marcucci, E. (2003) Individual uncertainty and the political acceptability of road pricing
policies, in: J. Schade and B. Schlag, (Eds) Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies, pp. 279–297
(Oxford: Elsevier Science).
Maruyama, T. and Sumalee, A. (2007) Efficiency and equity comparison of cordon-and area-based
road pricing schemes using a trip-chain equilibrium model, Transportation Research Part A, 41(7),
pp. 655–671.
Mayeres, I. and Proost, S. (2002)  Reforming Transport Pricing: An Economist’s Perspective on
Equity, Efficiency and Acceptability.  Technical Report (Belgium: KU Leuven, Center for
Economic Studies).
Medin, H., Nyborg, K. and Bateman, I. (2001) The assumption of equal marginal utility of income:























































Metz, D. (2008) National road pricing: a critique and an alternative, Transport, 161(3), pp. 167–174.
Mitchell, G. (2005) Forecasting environmental equity: air quality responses to road user charging in
Leeds, UK, Journal of Environmental Management, 77(3), pp. 212–226.
Mohring, H. (1999) Congestion, in: J. Gomez-Ibanez, W. Tye and C. Winston (Eds) Essays in Transpor-
tation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer, pp. 181–222 (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press).
Nakamura, K. and Kockelman, K. (2002) Congestion pricing and roadspace rationing: an application
to the San Francisco Bay Bridge corridor, Transportation Research Part A, 36(5), pp. 403–417.
Nash, C. (2001) Equity versus efficiency in transport systems, in: A. Hensher (Ed) Handbook of Transport
Systems and Traffic Control, pp. 33–45 (London: Pergamon).
Nash, C. (2003) Marginal cost and other pricing principles for user charging in transport: a comment,
Transport Policy, 10(4), pp. 345–348.
Newbery D. and Santos, G. (1999) Road taxes, road user charges and earmarking, Fiscal Studies, 20(2),
pp. 103–132.
Nix, F. (2001) Alternative Road Financing Arrangements. Technical report (Research conducted for the
Canadian Transportation Act Review). Available at: http://www.reviewctaexamenltc.gc.ca/
CTAReview/CTAReview/english/reports/nix.pdf (accessed 7 September 2009).
Oberholzer-Gee, F. and Weck-Hannemann, H. (2002) Pricing road use: politico-economic and fairness
considerations, Transportation Research Part D, 7(5), pp. 357–371.
Odeck, J. and Brathen, S. (1997) On public attitudes toward implementation of toll roads: the case of
Oslo toll ring, Transport Policy, 4(2), pp. 73–83.
Olszewski, P. and Xie, L. (2005) Modelling the effects of road pricing on traffic in Singapore, Transpor-
tation Research Part A, 39(7–9), pp. 755–772.
Padam, S. and Wijkmark, B. (2000) Ways and Means to Increase the Acceptance of Urban Road Pricing.
Technical report (Project funded by the European Commisson under The Transport Rtd Programme
of the 4th Framework Programme). Available at: http://www.ecoplan.ch/download/
e73_sb_en.pdf (accessed 7 September 2009).
Parkany E. (2005) Environmental justice issues related to transponder ownership and road pricing,
Transportation Research Record, 1932, pp. 97–108.
Parry, I. and Bento, A. (2001) Revenue recycling and the welfare effects of road pricing, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 103(4), pp. 645–671.
Patterson, T. (2007) Lexus lanes or corolla lanes? Spatial use and equity patterns on the I-394 MnPASS
lanes. Master’s thesis, University of Minnesota.
Pigou, A. (1912) The Economics of Welfare (Reprint ed. 2002) (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction).
Raje, R. (2003) The impact of transport on social exclusion processes with specific emphasis on road
user charging, Transport Policy, 10(4), pp. 321–338.
Raje, F., Grieco, M. and McQuaid, R. (2004) Edinburgh, Road Pricing and the Boundary Problem: Issues of
Equity and Efficiency. Technical report (Stirling: Scottish Economics Policy Network).
Ramjerdi, R. (2006) Equity measures and their performance in transportation, Transportation Research
Record, 1983, pp. 67–74.
Ramsey, R. (1927) A contribution to the theory of taxation, Economic Journal, 37(145), pp. 47–61.
Richards, M. (2008) Congestion charging: an idea whose time has come but not yet, at least not in
England, Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2079, pp. 21–28.
Rietveld, P. (2003) Winners and losers in transport policy: on efficiency, equity, and compensation, in:
D. A. Hensher and K. J. Button (Ed) Handbook of Transport and the Environment, pp. 585–602 (Amster-
dam: Elsevier).
Rilett, L. R. and Benedek, C. M. (1994) Traffic assignment under environmental and equity objectives.
Transportation Research Record, 1443, p. 92.
Safirova, E., Gillingham, K., Perry, I., Nelson, P., Harrington, W. and Mason, D. (2004) Welfare and
distributional effects of road pricing schemes for metropolitan Washington, DC, in: G. Santos (Ed)
Road Pricing: Theory and Evidence, pp. 179–206 (Oxford: Elsevier).
Safirova, E., Houde, S., Lipman, D., Harrington, W. and Baglino, A. (2006) Congestion Pricing: Long-
Term Economic and Land use Effects. Technical Report (Discussion paper 06–37) (Washington, DC:
Resources for the Future).
Santos, G. and Rojey, L. (2004) Distributional impacts of road pricing: the truth behind the myth,
Transportation, 31(1), pp. 21–42.
Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (2003) Acceptability of urban transport pricing strategies,  Transportation
Research Part F: Psychology and Behaviour, 6(1), pp. 45–61.
Schweitzer, L. and Taylor, B. (2008) Just pricing: comparing the effects of congestion pricing and trans-






















































0Equity Effects of Road Pricing 57
Sen, A. (1992) Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Small, K. (1983) The incidence of ongestion tolls on urban highways, Journal of Urban Economics, 13(1),
pp. 90–111.
Small, K. (1992) Using the revenues from congestion pricing, Transportation, 19(4), pp. 359–381.
Smirti, M., Evans, A., Gougherty, M. and Morris, E. (2007) Politics, public opinion, and project design
in California road pricing, Transportation Research Record, 1996, pp. 41–48.
Smith, Z. (2000) The Petrol Tax Debate (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies).
Steininger, K., Friedl, B. and Gebetsroither, B. (2007) Sustainability impacts of car road pricing: a
computable general equilibrium analysis for Austria, Ecological Economics, 63(1), pp. 59–69.
Sullivan, E. (2000) Continuation Study to Evaluate the Impacts of the SR 91 Value-Priced Express Lanes:
Final Report. Submitted to State of California Department of Transportation Traffic Operations
Program HOV Systems Branch, Sacramento CA, Vol. 94273.
Supernak, J., Golob, J., Golob, T., Kaschade, C., Kazimi, C., Schreffler, E. and Steffey, D. (2002) San
Diego’s interstate 15 congestion pricing project: attitudinal, behavioral, and institutional issues,
Transportation Research Record, 1812, pp. 78–86.
Teubel, U. (2000) The welfare effects and distributional impact of road user charges on commuters-an
empirical analysis of Dresden, International Journal of Transport Economics, 27(2), pp. 231–256.
Tilahun, N. and Levinson, D. (2009) Unexpected delay and the cost of lateness on I-394 high occupancy/
toll lanes, in: W. Saleh and G. Sammer (Eds) Travel Demand Management and Road User Pricing: Success,
Failure and Feasibility, pp. 173–184 (London: Ashgate).
Truelove, P. (1998) The political feasibility of road pricing, Economic Affairs, 18(4), pp. 15–20.
Ungemah, D. (2007) This land is your land, this land is my land: addressing equity and fairness in
tolling and pricing, Transportation Research Record, 2013, pp. 13–20.
Verhoef, E., Nijkamp, P. and Rietveld, P. (1996) Second-best congestion pricing: the case of an untolled
alternative, Journal of Urban Economics, 40(3), pp. 279–302.
Verhoef, E., Niskanen, E., Proost, S. and Rouwendal, J. (2003) Phasing and Packaging of Pricing Reform:
The MC-ICAM approach.  Technical report (Fourth seminar of the IMPRINT-EUROPE Thematic
Network Implementing Pricing Policies in Transport: Phasing and Packaging, Brussels, 13–14 May).
Vickrey, W. (1965) Pricing as a tool in coordination of local transportation, Transportation Economics,
pp. 275–296 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Viegas, J. (2001) Making urban road pricing acceptable and effective: searching for quality and equity
in urban mobility, Transport Policy, 8(4), pp. 289–294.
Weinstein, A. and Sciara, G. (2006) Unraveling equity in HOT lane planning: a view from practice,
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 26(2), p. 174.
Whittles, M. (2003) Urban Road Pricing: Public and Political Acceptability (London: Ashgate)
Whitty, J. and Imholt, B. (2005) Oregons Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program. Report to
the 73rd Oregon Legislative Assembly on proposed alternatives to the current system of taxing
highway use through motor vehicle fuel taxes.
Wilson, P. (1988) Welfare effects of congestion pricing in Singapore, Transportation, 15(3), pp. 191–210.
Xin, W and Levinson, D. (2006) Stochastic congestion and pricing model with endogenous departure
time selection and heterogeneous travelers, Proceedings of 11th international conference for Hong
Kong Society of Transportation Studies, Hong Kong, China, December 2006.
Yin, Y. and Lawphongpanich, S. (2006) Internalizing emission externality on road networks, Transpor-
tation Research Part D, 11(4), pp. 292–301.
Zhang, L. and Levinson, D. (2005) Road pricing with autonomous links, Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 1932, pp. 147–155.
Zhang, L., Levinson, D. and Zhu, S. (2008) Agent-based model of price competition, capacity choice,
and product differentiation on congested networks, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 42(3),
pp. 435–461.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
L
e
v
i
n
s
o
n
,
 
D
a
v
i
d
]
 
A
t
:
 
2
1
:
3
9
 
2
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
1
0